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Tariffs, subsidies and profits: a re-assessment of structural
change in Australia 1901-1939

Abstract

We re-interpret the drivers of structural change in Australia from Federation to
World War II. Manufacturing increased its relative share of output and
employment, the farm sector and mining contracted. The conventional wisdom is
that these shifts largely resulted from government policy, particularly increases in
trade barriers that stimulated import substitution by manufacturers. We contend
that the connection between tariffs and increased profitability is conceptually weak
and not supported by extant evidence. We argue that a wide range of stimuli was
responsible for manufacturing increasing its share of the economy’s resources and
output. These included exogenous shifts in consumer preferences, the adoption of
new technologies, changing factor proportions, and greater specialization in
manufacturing and services.

JEL categories: N17, N67, O24
Keywords: tariff policy, profitability, technology, consumption
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INTRODUCTION

In the first half of the twentieth century, the Australian economy took a substantial
shift away from its reliance on resource-based industries. Manufacturing industry
lifted its share of both output and employment. Nearly all of the growth in the share of
manufacturing was accounted for by a reduction in that of the farm and mining
sectors. A very large tertiary sector oscillated around its trend. The data sets of GDP,
employment and capital formation generated by Butlin and others1 provide the
starting point for discussion. These data will be reviewed in the second section of the
paper.

The conventional explanation of the relative rise of manufacturing rests largely on the
role of the tariff. Rising levels of tariff protection enabled local producers to capture a
larger share of the market from increasingly expensive imports. The literature on
structural change will be discussed in the third section. The paper will then proceed by
arguing that the previous explanations of sectoral change do not provide a convincing
account of the rise of manufacturing relative to the primary sector let alone the rise
and fall of industries within manufacturing. New data of profits at the industry level
promises to provide a more accurate picture of the changing choice set facing people
making strategic decisions about where to do business.2 These data highlight the role
of both changes in output prices, as captured in the discussion of tariffs and subsidies,

1

Butlin, Australian Domestic Product; Keating, Australian Workforce; Butlin and Dowie, Estimates of

Australian workforce, pp. 38-55.
2

See Merrett and Ville, Returns to enterprise.
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and developments on the supply side. Technological change, endogenous and
exogenous, transformed the landscape of relative profitability. Much of the changing
structure of the Australian economy was the result of the emergence of new industries
founded on new production possibilities. There was a sequential dimension to this
process with the developments up stream in the generation of new sources of energy,
particularly electricity, being a precondition for changes down stream. We will deploy
a wide range of primary and secondary sources to substantiate our alternative account.

STRUCTURAL CHANGE, 1901-39

The structure of the Australian economy altered in many ways in the first half of the
twentieth century. The big picture is a relative growth of manufacturing that is nearly
offset by a contraction in rural and mining activity with the large service sector
remaining at a roughly constant figure. National income account data of product
indicate shifts in the relative importance at a sector level.3 The broad shifts revealed
by these indicators are mirrored by changes in the distribution of the workforce.4
Research on particular sectors, industries or regions provides evidence of absolute
expansion or decline that adds detail and nuance to the broad sweep of the aggregate
data, including the shifting balance between the size of the public and private sector.5
3

Butlin, Australian Domestic Product; Idem, Australian economic development; Dowie, Service

ensemble.
4

Butlin and Dowie, Estimates of Australian workforce.

5

Forster, Industrial Development; Snooks, Depression and Recovery; Barnard, and Butlin, Public and

private capital formation, pp.354-67; Sinclair, Capital formation, pp. 11-65; Mathews and Jay, Federal
Finance Tables 13 and 22, pp. 102 and 169.
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Together the GDP and employment series demonstrate the broad sweep of change in
the structure of the economy from 1901 up to World War II. The data is shown in
Tables 1 and 2 below. Manufacturing grew significantly both in terms of its share of
employment, from 15 to 24 per cent, and its share of output, 12 to 19 per cent, from a
low base. Its expansion was broadly matched by the contraction in the resource-based
sector of farming and mining, a decline in share of employment from 33 to 23 per cent
and a fall in share of output from 30 to 23 per cent. Services, to which the utilities of
gas, electricity and water, and construction are added to become the tertiary sector,
were the cornerstone of the economy with a largely unchanged contribution of around
53 to 58 per cent for employment and product respectively.

Table 1 about here

Table 2 about here

The data are widely recognized as robust indicators of trends. However, there are
shortcomings in using them as measures of structural change. The two key references
are Butlin (1962) and Keating (1973) who constructed the long term estimates of
national accounts and workforce data respectively. These series have been subject to
commentary and revisions.6 There are a number of problems. These data rely heavily
on the Production Bulletins covering farming, mining and manufacturing and the
population Census. The very large service sector is practically invisible. Attempts to
calculate its output are bedeviled by the intangible nature of the product. Valuations
6

See references in note 1 above.
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of its inputs are used instead. This places great reliance on the accuracy of the
employment series in services, which rest heavily on inter-census interpolation that
masks year to year fluctuations, and wage data that is less than comprehensive.
Further conceptual and practical issues arise in drawing boundaries between the
sectors. Some authors, such as Dowie, aggregate the nine industry classification used
by Butlin to a threefold classification, viz, primary, secondary and tertiary.7 This
process involves making important decisions about boundaries, particularly about
whether mining should be included with the rural sector or with manufacturing, and
whether industries such as construction and utilities that have tangible product should
be separated from ‘services’. Similar problems arose when classifying workers
amongst occupations. In his Report about the 1933 Census, the Statistician concluded
that ‘the taxonomic problem [of classifying occupations] is never completely solved.
It is complicated by the development of new fields of industrial enterprise and by the
splitting and overlapping of fields previously conventionally definable, by the
emergence of new occupations, crafts and callings, [and] by the further specialization
and division of labour…’8

EXPLANATIONS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE

7

Maddock and McLean follow Boehm in using four: ‘farming’, ‘mining’, ‘manufacturing’ and ‘other’.

Maddock and McLean, ‘Australian economy’, Table 1.2, 19. A recent contribution continues with the
three-sector approach (agriculture, industry, and services) but does disaggregate ‘industry’ in a
subsequent table. Broadberry and Irwin, Lost exceptionalism?, pp. 269-70.
8

Statistician’s Report, Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1933, p. 214.
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Describing the structural shift has, nonetheless, proven to be more straightforward
than explaining what caused it to take place. The aggregate data captures the net
outcome of hundreds of thousands of decisions taken by businesses and households in
any year. The ‘shape’ of the economy9 altered continuously as entrepreneurs,
investors and workers readjusted their behaviours in the light of a set of price signals.
The most relevant sets of information were the terms of trade between industries10 and
the relative profitability of firms between industries, the latter showing the return to
investing in a bundle of resources to produce those goods and services.

The existing literature has focused most of its attention on one set of price signals,
tariffs and subsidies. Tariffs rose from 1907 onwards driving a wedge between
domestic and ‘free trade’ prices for manufactures.11 There are two indices of the
‘height’ of the tariff. The first is a simple average of the revenue collected divided by
the value of net imports, both dutiable and total, entering the country in the same
9

Butlin, Shape of the Australian economy.

10

‘… the inter-sectoral terms of trade…governed resource allocation within the domestic economy.’

Thomas, Manufacturing, p. 269.
11

For a discussion of the political economy of changes in the tariff see Reitsma, Trade Protection in

Australia, ch. 2; Anderson and Garnaut, Australian Protectionism, chs. 2 & 4. The tariff was subject to
broad revisions in 1908, 1911, 1914, 1921, 1926 and 1928 before the introduction of a host of
emergency measures in the Scullin Tariff between August 1929 and July 1931. Tariff schedules were
further affected in the 1930s as Australia offered increased preference to Britain and other trading
partners through its participation in the Ottawa Agreement in 1932 and the ill-fated trade diversion
policies of the late 1930s. The introduction of preferential tariffs from 1908 meant that the rate of duty
differed according to the country from which the import was sourced. Furthermore, the Tariff Board,
established in 1921, made numerous alterations to duties on individual items throughout the 1920s and
1930s. Linge, Australian Tariff Board Reports.
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year.12 Chart 1 shows that the average rate of duty paid on those imports on which
duty was payable remained roughly constant from 1903 until the beginning of World
War I when it fell until 1921 before rising above pre-war levels at the onset of the
1929 depression. Average rates rose sharply in the early 1930s and remained on a
relatively high plateau, inflated by primage duty levied from 1931 to 1939, but with a
declining trend due to rate adjustments and the preferential system under the Ottawa
Agreement. The ratio of duty paid on all imports followed the same broad pattern
although the percentage of imports admitted free of duty fluctuated by rising before
the World War I, falling in the 1920s and rising again in the 1930s.13 The simple
average method has a downward bias in that, ceteris paribus, the higher the rate of
duty the lower the value of imports and so the less duty collected. Another study has
recalculated the data, using a sample of commodities for which corresponding import
and production figures are available, using local production and imports as the
denominator.14 This series, an index, shows higher rates of increase in the ‘weight’ of
the tariff than the simple average especially during the 1920s. Finally, Lloyd has
constructed tariff series for all and dutiable clearances with adjustments for refunds
and drawbacks of duties.15

Chart 1 about here

12

Australia, Overseas Trade Bulletin, various.

13

The impact of the revised tariff schedules was two-fold. Rates were increased and more goods were

made dutiable. Commonwealth Year Book of Australia 1921, pp. 503-05.
14

Carmody, Australian tariff, pp. 51-65.

15

Lloyd, 100 years of tariff protection.
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None of the series discussed in the last paragraph correlate closely with the structural
change identified in the previous section. Chart 1 indicates very little concordance
between trends in average tariff rates and manufacturing’s share of GDP or
employment. The only trend similarity between tariffs and the employment share was
during World War One and, for tariffs and GDP share, during 1925-26 and 1928-29.
More broadly, manufacturing’s rising share of GDP from about 1904 to 1925-26 was
not accounted for by trends in tariff rates, for which there was no distinct secular
movement. While the Scullin tariff lifted average rates steeply between 1928-29 and
1931/2, the GDP and employment shares fell during the Slump. The subsequent rise
in manufacturing’s share on both measures is in contrast to declining average tariff
rates in the 1930s. Nor are there any obvious lagged relationships. In addition to this
broad picture, corresponding data on tariff levels and employment exist for a limited
number of individual products in the interwar period, testing of which has provided no
support for a causal relationship between the two.16

Governments also altered the ratio of domestic to ‘free trade’ prices through other
means, primarily subsidies to domestic producers. Bounties and subsidies were paid to
producers in many industries. However, the farming industries were the major
recipients. The form of subsidy ranged from producers receiving cash grants through
to being provided with transport services at less than cost and price support

16

Production Bulletins and Overseas Trade Bulletins for 1918-19, 1928-29 and 1938-39 provided data

for changes in employment and import duties. Scatter diagrams of the data proved inconclusive and
problems of endogeneity among the variables cautions against seeking a causal relationship through
regression analysis.

9

schemes.17 A number of attempts were made in the late 1920s and 1930s to estimate
the value of this assistance.18 The authors of The Australian Tariff calculated that the
subsidy equivalent of the tariff to manufacturing was £26 million in 1926-27 while
primary industries were not far behind receiving £22 million. By 1932-33, the subsidy
equivalent paid to primary industry had risen to £29 million with the amount going to
manufacturing having fallen to £19 million.19

Contemporary economists decried the allocative effect of tariffs and subsidies.20 They
argued, in some memorable prose, that these policies distorted markets in ways that
led to a loss of national welfare. Shann, for instance, wrote in 1929 of the creation of a
system of ‘faked prices’ that ‘deranges and weakens [the] whole economy.’21 Benham
asserted that ‘there has been deliberate interference with the “price-mechanism,”’22
likening this to the actions of a ‘Dictator’.23 All agreed that Australia’s comparative
advantage lay in its resource-based industries. The farm and mining industries were
exporters who, of necessity, accepted the world price for their products. In contrast,
manufacturing and services were sheltered from world markets, the former because of
tariffs and the latter by its non-tradeable nature. The export sector could not pass on

17

See Eggleston, State Socialism; Butlin, Barnard, and Pincus, Government and Capitalism.

18

Giblin, Marketing control, pp. 148-54; Brigden, et.al., Australian Tariff, Part IV and Appendices N

and O; and Nimmo, Effect of the tariff , pp. 118-19.
19

Nimmo, Effect of the tariff, p. 121.

20

Benham, Prosperity of Australia, chapter 5; Brigden, et.al., Australian Tariff; Giblin, Marketing

control.
21

Shann, Economic History, p.447.

22

Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 139.

23

Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 137.
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higher costs to its customers whereas the sheltered industries could. Tariffs raised the
input costs of the export sector so narrowing its margins. Moreover, increases in
domestic prices feed back into higher wages through an indexation mechanism.24 By
the late 1920s there was serious concern that the process may have gone too far by
threatening the viability of the export industries. The rapid increase in the level of
assistance being given to the minor rural industries even before the onset of the 1930s
depression served to reinforce the point. As Giblin so famously wrote:
The vision that comes is of Australia as one enormous sheep bestriding a
bottomless pit, with statesman, lawyer, miner, landlord, farmer and factory
hand all hanging on desperately to the locks of its abundant fleece. The limits
to protection are set by what the sheep will carry, and there are definite limits
to that, even if the threat of synthetic wool remains only a threat.25

The debate about the welfare loss associated with the tariff has continued to the
present day. Anderson and Garnaut encapsulate the prevailing view with the statement
that ‘one of the most robust conclusions from economic theory is that protection
reduces per capita national income of a small economy.’26 The analysis undertaken by
Brigden and his co-authors of The Australian Tariff has been revised over the years by
more formal and increasingly sophisticated modeling.27 This literature, which draws
heavily on international trade theory, largely passes over the issue of the mechanism

24

Hancock, Australian wage policy, pp. 129-60.

25

Giblin, Marketing control, p.154.

26

Anderson and Garnaut, Australian Protectionism, p. 12.

27

Coleman, Cornish and Hagger, Giblin’s Platoon, pp. 56-73 & 80-83; Tyers and Coleman, Beyond

Brigden; Athukorala and Chand, Tariff-growth nexus.
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by which tariffs caused manufacturing to grow relative to the rest of the economy in
terms of the resources it used and its share of product.

The link between tariffs and subsidies and the relative expansion of manufacturing in
the economy is made most clearly by Benham. Tariffs result in higher domestic prices
than would be the case under free trade and also permit the manufacturer to pay
higher money wages. He argues that ‘“protected” industries are thus rendered more
profitable, and more capital and labour therefore flows towards them, than would be
the case under free trade.’28 Moreover, ‘…labour and resources are deliberately
diverted away from non-protected industries and towards protected industries, or,
broadly speaking, away from Primary Production and towards Manufacturing.’29

The question is how much of the shift towards manufacturing was the result of such
policies? Benham equivocates noting that the share of workers in the primary sector
had fallen secularly in advanced economies as a result of technological change. He
concludes that the tariff had really operated at the margin, as under free trade
‘Manufacturing would have expanded to a somewhat smaller extent, and in a
somewhat different way.’30 The structure of manufacturing was altered as ‘labour and
resources were diverted to the more highly protected Manufacturing industries.’31

28

Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 138.

29

Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 139.

30

Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 146. Emphasis in the original.

31

Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p.162.
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Benham and others have argued that the profits of manufacturers rose as tariffs rose.
Local producers, it is alleged, will charge higher prices as tariffs rise because they can
be ‘passed on.’32 Increased average revenues are assumed to result in higher profits.
This is not necessarily the case. Let us suppose that imports and domestic products are
perfect substitutes33, and that imports make up 20 per cent of the market. A new tariff
of 10 per cent is imposed on imports that results in zero demand for those products.
What is the appropriate response of the local firms if they are profit-maximizing? Let
us also suppose that each firm was in an equilibrium position, with marginal cost and
marginal revenues equal, before the onset of the tariff. How will they respond to the
tariff? They can raise their price to the pre-tariff price plus duty. Demand will fall
correspondingly. However, by taking this action their marginal revenues will rise
above marginal costs. Profit maximizing behaviour will lead each firm to increase its
supply back to the pre-tariff production level so reducing the price. If the new price,
with 80 per cent of the pre-tariff demand being supplied, exceeds the pre-tariff price
existing firms in the industry will have an incentive to increase supply and/or new
entrants would start production as long as they can do so without marginal costs
exceeding marginal revenues. Production would increase to the point where the 20 per
cent of the market supplied by imports has been met locally. The price would fall
back to the pre-tariff level as long as there is a competitive market.

Those making the argument in the 1920s that an increase in tariffs would increase
profits had seen fit to qualify the case. By raising prices after a tariff increase, firms
would trigger a subsequent increase in costs. Cost rises were of two sorts. The first

32

Brigden, et.al., Australian Tariff, Part V, Passing on of excess cost.

33

A questionable assumption. See Thomas, Manufacturing, pp. 249-51.
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came from the centralized wage system that automatically adjusted the Basic Wage to
movements in price indexes that measured the ‘cost of living’. A combination of
higher prices for imports and domestic goods would feed through into quarterly ‘cost
of living’ adjustments. Secondly, insofar as firms relied on imported inputs their costs
were increased.34 In its Reports in the 1920s the Tariff Board lamented that firms were
using the increased costs as a rationale for greater protection and expressed alarm at
the growing divergence between money wages in Australia and overseas.35 The
impact on the margins earned by firms of these costs pressures would once again
depend on industry and firm-specific factors. In general terms, though, Australian
manufacturing was relatively labour intensive with a high degree of reliance upon
imported inputs making it hard to escape the conclusion that the supposed positive
stimuli to profits given by tariffs in the first instance were quickly moderated by these
feedback loops. A recent study of US trade policy in the late nineteenth century has
also highlighted the significance of tariff-induced increases in the price of nontradeable goods with the effect that an average 30 per cent import tariff translated into
only a 17 per cent implicit subsidy to import-competing producers.36

The impact of tariffs on profitability will also depend on the degree of industry
competitiveness. First, the elasticity of supply of the domestic industry matters.37
34

Roughly three-quarters of imports were producer goods. Thomas, Manufacturing, p. 266, notes 14,

15.
35

Brigden, et.al., Australian Tariff, Appendix C.

36

Irwin, Tariff incidence’.

37

‘…the capacity to increase prices differs greatly between …industries. It depends upon the

conditions of supply and demand for the goods produced. Where demand is fairly rigid, and the supply
is responsive to market conditions, the necessary increase in prices may be almost automatic.
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Competitive industries are more likely to increase their supply than more highly
concentrated ones, so reducing price below the post-tariff import price. Local
monopolies can set a price to maximize profits. Industries with binding cartel
agreements could hold prices above competitive levels after the tariff was imposed.
How competitive was Australian manufacturing in the first four decades of the
twentieth century? A common view has been that many industries had high levels of
seller concentration and/or engaged in collusive behaviour especially with respect to
price agreements.38 A recent study has found that the increase in seller concentration
in many manufacturing industries before World War II was the result of the adoption
of new technologies that allowed for significant economies of scale.39 Barriers to
entry rose quickly in those industries where firms could reap economics of scale or
establish powerful brands.40 Firms enjoying market power defended their above
normal returns behind barriers to entry that became increasingly difficult for new
entrants to breach. However, these barriers were breached if the rewards on offer were
large enough. There was entry into even highly concentrated industries such as glass,
rubber tyres and confectionery by both foreign and domestic firms.41 In a related
research project, the authors have recently shown that profitability and new capital
issues, both in manufacturing and the economy as a whole, followed very similar

Differences in conditions of supply are probably the more important causes of differences in capacity
to increase prices to cover the costs imposed.’ Brigden, et.al., Australian Tariff, p.53
38

Butlin, Barnard & Pincus, Government and Capitalism, ch. 4. See also Wilkinson, Trust Movement;

Rawlings, Who Owns Australia?
39

Fleming, Merrett and Ville, Big End of Town; Forster, Economies of scale.

40

Bain, Barriers to New Competition.

41

Fountain, Technology acquisition, pp. 89-108; Barker, Pilkington; Jones, Multinational chocolate;

Stanton, Protection, market structure.
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trajectories through the interwar period. Economy-wide, there was an 85 per cent
correlation between the annual series for the return on equity and the number of new
capital issues, 1920-38.42 This would suggest that new investment, by incumbents
and new entrants, flowed largely unimpeded into profitable industries and products.

Technological change and shifts in labour-capital ratios were commonplace in the
economy. Often the two were associated as technology was embodied in new
machinery that reduced the need for labour or substituted lower cost process workers
for craftsmen. The importance of these developments has been underplayed in the
literature, which has focused its attention on the gap between productivity levels in
Australia and overseas.43 Our concern is with the impact of such investments on
relative profitability amongst firms within the domestic industry. In such
circumstances, competitive advantage amongst firms within an industry could swing
in favour of those undertaking most investment in new production methods. Firms
with lower costs had an incentive to increase supply to the point where the new
equilibrium price was lower than the pre-tariff price. Is there evidence to support this
argument? Colin Forster concluded after a careful review of the data that ‘although it
is impossible to measure with precision the growth of manufacturing productivity in
Australia during the 1920s, general considerations indicate that the increase was
substantial.’44 Even those authors who continue to focus on lower levels of
manufacturing productivity than other nations acknowledge that such a divergence
42

Both series are calculated from data in Australian Investment Digest, various years.

43

This continues to be the case. Broadberry and Irwin, Lost exceptionalism?; Irwin, Australian

exceptionalism revisited; McLean, Why was Australia; Huberman and Minns, The times they are not
changin.
44

Forster, Industrial Development, p.224.
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existed prior to major tariff increases and applied equally to a non-traded sector like
construction.45 Mark Thomas argued that Australian manufacturing increased in
competitiveness vis-a-vis imports in the 1930s, through a combination of ‘the
increased efficiency of Australian industry and declining input prices.’46 This resulted,
in part, from the growth of the local market that permitted the realization of
economies of scale in some industries but, Forster suggests, was insufficient to
provide minimum efficient scale for those capital-intensive and science-based
industries of the second industrial revolution.47 However, new technologies were
adopted in many industries that provided an opportunity for incumbents or entrants to
reshape the nature of ‘rivalry’.48 Moreover, there occurred the substitution of
machinery for labour on a large scale across a wide range of industries. Once again,
there were marked differences in the extent and timing of this process between
industries that could explain the reconfiguration of industry structure.49

Thomas, more broadly, casts doubt on the link between changes in tariff rates and the
expansion of manufacturing in his study of recovery from the 1930s depression.50 His
analysis of the role of import substitution as a contributor to output growth throughout
the inter-war period demonstrates that there was no simple relationship between
increases in tariffs, devaluation, and declining import penetration. The 1921 tariff, and

45

Irwin, Australian exceptionalism, pp. 232-3.

46

Thomas, Manufacturing, p. 267. See pp. 255-260.

47

Forster, Economies of scale, pp. 167-8.

48

Eyre, ed, Technology in Australia. See Porter, Competitive Strategy, pp. 17-23.

49

Mauldon, Mechanisation, Tables XI, XII and XIII, pp. 40 (a) and (b), 57 and 62.

50

Thomas, Manufacturing, pp. 246-71.
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further revisions in 1926 and 1928, did not result in increased import substitution.51
The decomposition of output growth shows that import substitution made a negative
contribution to the growth of total expenditure between 1919-20 and 1928-29.52 In
marked contrast, there was a sharp increase in the contribution of import substitution
between 1928-29 and 1931-32. However, he argues that this resulted more from the
increased competitiveness of Australian manufacturing as domestic costs fell than
from the impact of either the Scullin Tariff or devaluation. Moreover, import
substitution played a negative role during the recovery phase after 1932 up to the
outbreak of World War II. He concludes that ‘the contribution of massive import
substitution to Australian recovery appears on such evidence to be a myth.’53

From a comparative perspective, recent research on manufacturing expansion in
different periods of United States history provides some support for a more muted
influence of tariff policy. Irwin has variously concluded that the cotton industry could
have survived without tariffs by 1830, that the belated development of the tinplate
industry was due to high input costs not lack of protection, and that post-bellum
industrial protection was moderated by the impact of import duties on the price of
non-traded goods.54 Focusing recently on the major structural shift of the United
States economy towards manufacturing from the 1890s, Irwin rejects the McKinley
tariff as the central explanation in favour of cost-reducing natural resource
discoveries.55
51

Thomas, Manufacturing, p. 252.

52

Thomas, Manufacturing, Table 11.2, p. 255.

53

Thomas, Manufacturing, p. 255.

54

55

Irwin and Temin, Ante-bellum tariff; Irwin, Did late nineteenth-century; ibid, Tariff incidence.
Irwin, Explaining America’s surge.
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AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE

An alternative perspective emphasizes previously neglected dynamic elements in the
Australian economy as entrepreneurs and business people responded to the many
opportunities presented to them. Our contention is that the nature of the Australian
economy was markedly different in 1939 from what it had been in 1901. The range of
goods and services on offer was far wider. Changes in consumption patterns provided
opportunities for firms to develop new markets, Edith Penrose’s interstices.56 The
technologies underpinning production and distribution were far more advanced. Cost
functions were realigned by the adoption of new technology, much of which was
labour saving. Changes in demand and supply schedules across the economy
prompted firms to adjust their behaviours in an attempt to lift profitability or to ward
off failure. Shifts in demand and supply factors were played out in thousands of
micro-markets in which firms competed. Factors exogenous to the firms were
responsible for some of the shifts in both the demand and supply schedules. However,
firms increasingly built the capabilities to influence the demand for their products
through branding and advertising, and to create superior production technologies. The
resultant effect on changes in demand and supply factors over time was reflected in a
shifting in relative profitability between industries down to very narrow product
categories.

Modern Consumerism
56

Penrose, Growth of the Firm.

19

A number of powerful drivers of change can be identified on the demand side. There
was a strong demonstration effect from the United States and the United Kingdom
about what was on offer. Australians wanted to experience what was new and
different. The 1920s in particular was a decade of experimentation. Expenditure
patterns shifted under the weight of three forces: a growing demand for consumer
durables; a growing preference for entertainment and leisure activities; and the
emergence of a new category of expenditure, fast moving consumer goods.

Australian consumers and producers were aware of the new consumer products,
particularly consumer durables, coming onto markets in North America and Europe
after World War I. Immigrants brought this personal knowledge with them. Australian
residents saw this ‘new’ world through the medium of letters from relatives living
abroad, newspapers, magazines and cinema and in shop windows. They observed the
purchases of their family and friends. What might have seemed unobtainable luxuries
became necessities for more and more families under the siren call of advertising.57
Household budgets were thus rearranged to reflect changes in the composition of
demand in the light of an expanding set of products and services. In turn, this
contributed to changes in the relative profitability of firms and the relative size of
industries.
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The decade of the 1920s has been identified as the beginning of Australia’s progress
to becoming ‘a modern consumer society.’58 A sufficient number of households
possessed the discretionary income to purchase motor cars and a range of household
durables particularly small kitchen appliances.59 Hire purchase facilities allowed the
cost to be spread over a number of years. Whitwell argues that these expenditures rose
rapidly in the second half of the decade before falling away in the depression and war.
The extraordinary growth of consumer spending after 1945 was the start of a new era
rather than a continuation of a longer process.60 However, there are a range of
indicators to suggest that the demand for consumer durables continued strongly
throughout the 1930s. Table 3 indicates the rapid growth in popularity of durables
such as radios, telephones and motor vehicles.

Table 3 about here

The increased consumption of motor vehicles and household consumer durables such
as radios, washing machines, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners and the like necessarily
lagged behind investments in the construction of sealed roads and the provision of
electricity and gas. State and local governments made those investments on a large
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scale in the 1920s and 1930s.61 Private providers had also entered the energy sector
from the late nineteenth century. A hybrid system of state and private providers
continued up to World War II but the government utilities absorbed many of the
smaller private firms. The number and share of households connected to gas and
electricity rose rapidly between the wars. 34 per cent of homes in Australia had
electricity in 1923 a number that rose sharply later in the decade; by 1947 78 per cent
of private dwellings had electricity; just two points shy of the figure for the United
States of America in 1941.62 The 1947 Census confirms an almost complete coverage
of private houses in the metropolitan cities.63 While data points are relatively few and
far between, it appears that most of Sydney was already covered by 1939 thus locating
most of the growth in the interwar period.64

There was a growing market for electrical appliances, which provided opportunities
for local producers and distributors. A substantial electrical manufacturing industry
had been established in the 1920s to fill the demand for electric lighting and small
appliances such as irons and radiators.65 It continued to expand in the 1930s as sales
of washing machines, vacuum cleaners, refrigerators and gas cookers and heaters
continued to grow. The market was served by a combination of local manufacturers,
many of whom were foreign owned, and importers. The distribution channels ranged
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from door to door salesmen, to specialist stores and department stores. Hire purchase
or some form of vendor finance became common for the more expensive items.66

Consumption patterns altered in the face of new technologies, shorter working hours,
longer life expectancy and rising incomes.67 More was spent on entertainment and
leisure pursuits. Two illustrations suffice to make the point. First, the popular
entertainments of the nineteenth century, the circus, music hall and live theatre, were
challenged by the arrival of the cinema in the 1920s. The speed with which it became
a mass medium is astonishing.68 By 1927 there were 1,250 theatres that had sold 110
million tickets that year. Gross receipts were £5.5 million. Investment in the theatres
was estimated to be £25 million and 20,000 people worked in the industry.69 Sport
and recreation played an increasingly important part in Australian life. School
children were dragooned into organised physical activity. Participation was fostered
through school, church, neighbourhood and district competitions covering every sport
from archery to volley ball. Their parents might choose fishing, sailing, bowls or golf.
Recreational activity became institutionalized with state and national organizations
taking charge in all of the major sporting codes. Sport became mass entertainment as
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attendances at football matches, test cricket and racing rose.70 Much of the
infrastructure was provided by local government and churches. However, there were
plenty of opportunities left for business.71 The demand for sporting equipment and
specialized apparel including footwear grew.72 Large crowds at cricket grounds,
boxing stadiums, theatres, and race tracks required transport, food and drink, and at
the latter, gambling facilities. Posters, tickets and programs gave additional work to
printers, and newspapers’ sports sections fed the public’s demand for results and
information.

Fast moving consumer goods became an important part of expenditure patterns after
World War I. Until then, the category would have been confined to a small range of
products ― cigarettes, pipe tobacco, toiletries and confectionery. The list lengthened
in the 1920s and 1930s to include cosmetics such as face creams, lipstick, nail
polish,73 toothpaste and over the counter drugs such as ‘Aspro’.74 Confectionery also
became big business as the homemade or unbranded sweets of pre-World War I were
replaced by branded chocolates and toffees, and chewing gum. The soft drink market

70

See entries under type of sport in Chisholm, ed, Australian Encyclopaedia; Vamplew and Stoddart,

eds, Sport in Australia; Adair and Vamplew, Sport in Australian History; Cashman, Paradise of Sport.
71

Some boxing promoters, Hugh McIntosh, and SP bookies, John Wren, became millionaires. Van

Straten, Huge Deal; Buggy, John Wren.
72

Dunlop Australia first made a sandshoe in 1924. By 1930 half of its footwear production was for

sports. It began production of the famous ‘Volley’ tennis shoe in 1939.
http://www.dunlopfootwear.com.au/Volleys/default.asp. [Accessed 14 November 2006]
73

Woodhead, War Paint.

74

Grenville Smith and Barrie, Aspro.

24

was transformed by the adoption of the crown seal and commercial refrigeration.75
Children became important consumers in their own right, not only through their
expenditures of pocket money but as a new segment in the food market. The first
wave of convenience foods for breakfast, cereals, school lunches, vegemite and
processed cheese, and after school and bed time snacks, ice cream, milk chocolate and
cocoa came from the giant foreign food corporations of Kellogg’s, Kraft, Nestle,
Cadbury’s and the local Peters.76 These types of products, along with canned fruit and
baked beans, came in new and improved forms of packaging.

Supply Side Shifts
The economy was also experiencing a series of important changes on the supply side
that would in turn disturb existing equilibrium positions. Four will be considered
briefly: the sudden curtailment of imports occasioned by World War 1; the marked
increase in specialization of function; a refashioning of distribution channels; and the
growing importance of intellectual property as a firm resource and as a source of
competitive advantage.

Australia entered the war against Germany on 5 August 1914. The conflict played
havoc with Australia’s trade. A shortage of shipping space meant that the bulk of
commodity exports did not leave its shores for the duration of the war and imports
were similarly affected. Supplies of imported manufactures, including capital goods,
parts and components and finished goods were in short supply. The immediate impact
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on manufacturing industry was mixed. The number of workers employed remained
constant around 385,000,77 but the value of output shrank.78 Could local firms
compensate for the supply side shock? Their success was contingent on the
capabilities of domestic firms, in an economy where military needs tightened factor
markets, and the extent to which imported goods were critical to industry supply
chains. Importantly, an expansion in the local metals industries, iron and steel, zinc
and brass, permitted strong growth by downstream users. Some manufacturers entered
markets for the first time,79 while others found that an absence of import competition
enabled them to achieve economies of scale and to reduce their costs.80 Colin Forster
argued that ‘the net result was a change in the pattern of production so that the war
can be regarded as a definite transition period…’81

A more gradual and longer term impact of the expansion of the economy in the first
half of the twentieth century was the opportunity for an increased specialization of
function across the board. Butlin argues that the ‘gradual separation’ of the
‘institutional combination of manufacturing, trade and transport function, the
confusion of rural production, construction, transport and selling activities’ was a
‘basic feature of pre-1914 and interwar growth.’ This might, a priori, ‘enlarge
opportunities for increased efficiency.’82 Specialization could reduce costs
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independent of scale as firms improve efficiency due to cumulative experience.83
Evidence of the growth in specialization can be found in trade directories, where firms
advertised their wares to buyers. A review of the ‘Index to professions and trades
Melbourne and suburbs’ in the Sands & McDougall’s Directory of Victoria84 in 1920,
1930 and 1939 reveals significant change. There were 48 new categories in the 1930
edition compared with 1920, and another 218 categories in 1939 compared with 1930.
Thus, the number of occupations increased by a third over the interwar period,
although the actual number of new occupations was greater than this due to the
disappearance from the directory of some more traditional trades. The new entrants
were spread across services and manufacturing. The professions splintered into highly
specialist

groups,

particularly amongst

chemists

and

engineers.

Specialist

intermediaries and wholesalers abounded, including the valuers and auctioneers
making a market in second hand machinery. The list of manufacturing trades shows
the rapid emergence of a range of new industries and products such as air
conditioning, Christmas cards, gramophone records, ice cream cones and wafers,
hearing aids and spectacles.

This process of specialization was particularly evident in wholesale and retail
distribution. The role of the importing wholesaler, once the most important conduit
between Australian retailers and their foreign suppliers, was diminishing. The tariff
played its part. However, many of the larger retailers, particularly the department
stores, established their own buying offices abroad.85 Increasingly, these large
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metropolitan city-based stores either integrated backwards into production or formed
close links with domestic producers in relationships that exhibited considerable
countervailing power. Sidney Myer’s store in Bourke Street, Melbourne, borrowing
freely from models in the United States, became the pace setter for department stores
in the 1920s and 1930s. New types of specialist retailer were emerging. Chain stores
such as Moran and Cato in groceries, O. Gilpin’s in drapery and ironmongery, and G.
J. Coles in variety goods were well advanced before 1939.86 The expanding use of the
motor car brought dealerships, garages selling petrol and providing repairs, and used
car lots in its wake. The general store was challenged by specialist retailers, such as
grocers, Manchester, hardware and home wares.87 The clothing stores segmented the
market into women’s and men’s clothes, and youths and children. Moreover, hats,
corsets, fur coats, gloves and shoes for women would be sold in different
establishments. Purchases were driven by events such as parties and weddings, the
changing season and fashions rather than need. New forms of food retailers started to
trade in the 1930s, delicatessens, soda fountains and the soon to be ubiquitous milk
bar.88
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Additions to capital stock have figured prominently in the explanations of output and
productivity growth before World War II.89 The growing importance of intellectual
property to firms should also be recognised. Knowledge and know how was
embedded in organizational routines.90 Australian firms imported technology on a
large scale, a process that often included the transfer of machinery, blue prints and
skilled workers to assemble and train the local operatives. Examples can be drawn
from steel, glass and fertilizer industries.91 Businesses sought exclusive access to their
own technology through patents and to imported technology and the products it could
make through licensing agreements. Many new issues of this period were for the
purpose of purchasing the rights to manufacture another company’s goods, which
often included the purchase of patents or licences.92 Products were branded and
heavily promoted where ever possible. Firms registered trade marks and paid fees to
foreign firms to use their trade marks on products made under licence to protect their
property rights. These intangible assets were a source of competitive advantage to
firms and a factor contributing to differing rates of profits between and within
industries.93

Changes in demand or supply conditions had widespread repercussions across the
economy. The point is most simply made with reference to motor vehicles and
89
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electricity, two general purpose technologies that were diffusing rapidly through the
interwar economy.94 The pervasive impact of the motor car is captured by Womack,
Jones and Roos in their claim that ‘twice this century [the motor car] has changed our
most fundamental ideas of how we make things. And how we make things dictates not
only how we work, but what we buy, how we think, and the way we live.’95 The
growing demand for motor cars affected a number of up stream industries, such as oil
companies, road construction contractors, suppliers of aggregate and asphalt, and
manufacturers and installers of traffic signals. Consumption of motor cars generated a
new class of insurance risk, signaling increased competition within the insurance
industry, and spurred the development of the hire purchase industry. Down stream
garages sprang up to provide fuel, service and repair cars, with panel beaters and
spray painters emerging as separate entities. Used car yards, wreckers and scrap metal
merchants dealt with the older models. Motorists formed associations that vigorously
promoted their interests against competing users of road space.96 Commercial users of
motor trucks, buses and cars arose apace. The truck became a major source of
transport in the 1930s, while bus and taxi fleets also expanded.97 Electricity
generation had a pervasive impact on the economy. It reached back to the domestic
coal mining industry as a source of energy and spawned hydroelectric schemes.
Heavy engineering met its needs for both generation and transmission. Power was
essential for the expansion of the telephone network, which had its own feedback loop
94
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to business productivity by reducing communication costs. Power to factories greatly
increased their productivity. In the 1930s many small tools such as drills and grinders,
once hand tools, were fixed to a bench and power driven. The capacity of pumps and
compressors also increased.98 Electricity transformed offices by being used for
lighting, lifts, hot water systems, air conditioning, refrigeration, and to power office
equipment such as calculating machines. The retail trade, in particular, used electricity
for illuminating shop windows, powering cash registers and running lifts and
escalators in the larger department stores. By the late 1930s electrical appliances had
invaded every room in the house. The State Electricity Commission of Victoria, for
instance, boasted that there were 21 types of equipment other than lighting available.99

Our alternative story of structural change is a broad and contextualised one, which
reflects a series of changes occurring across the economy in both the conditions of
supply and of demand. There is no single dataset or model that can of itself capture
these changes. We have provided a range of quantitative and qualitative data to
support our thesis. However, if firms are expanding in response to a range of new
opportunities brought on by demand and supply side changes, we would expect to
find some degree of correlation between rates of capital formation and profitability
between industries. The direction of causality between profitability and capital
formation is not easy to specify – firms were responding to the profit signal in making
investment decisions but, equally, investing in cost-reducing new technology boosted
profits.
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We have extracted information from the Production Bulletins on operating surplus,
output, capital investment, numbers of employees and establishments, the latter four
as proxies for structural change, for a large range of manufacturing industries during
the interwar period. Surplus, a crude measure of profitability, is the value of output, at
wholesale prices, less the cost of inputs used such as raw materials and intermediate
goods, tools, power and utilities charges, and labor costs.100

We have split the

exercise into two sub-periods, 1919-29 and 1931-39, to reflect definitional changes
that preclude constructing a single unbroken series.

The results indicate a high degree of correlation between changes in surplus and the
four measures of structural change – capital, output, employees, and establishments suggesting that investment was flowing into those industries benefiting from the
positive impact of the various factors identified above.101 In particular, we find that
some of the best performers in terms of profits and structural change are highly
pertinent including electrical apparatus, lamps and fittings, and rubber goods. This
exercise adds further weight to our argument, in earlier sections of the paper, that
structural change was far more than simply a function of tariff protection for
industries lacking a competitive structure.

Table 4 about here
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CONCLUSION

From Federation to the eve of World War II the Australian economy added to its stock
of labour, capital and technology. The allocation of these resources within the
economy, however, altered significantly - manufacturing grew, the rural sector shrank
by the same amount, and the tertiary sector remained roughly constant. The question
is what motivated this reallocation. Consistent with recent revisionism on the
American economy, we contend that the conventional story of tariffs and subsidies
interfering with relative prices is at best a partial explanation. The thesis connecting
tariffs and increased profitability has not been clearly established in the literature and
does not provide a convincing explanation of how profits in manufacturing would rise
both absolutely and relatively after an increase in the tariff. Taking an industrial
organization perspective, the link is contingent on the competitive positioning of firms
after the tariff rise. We acknowledge that in some industries structural conditions
would allow tariffs to result in higher prices. However, we argue that a wide range of
stimuli was also responsible for manufacturing increasing its share of the economy’s
resources and output. Nor does the data, while problematic in some respects, lend
support to the conventional account. If we shift our attention away from the issues that
have dominated much of the literature, notably Australia’s comparative advantage and
its costs and productivity relative to those of its trading partners, a different picture
emerges.
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Our contention is that new opportunities for profitable investment were becoming
available in many parts of the economy because of changes on both the demand and
supply sides. Many of these changes were exogenous to Australia. The demonstration
effect was strong for both households and businesses. Information about new products
and services, and the technology required to produce them, flowed freely into the
country. Households shifted their preferences towards consumer durables,
entertainment and leisure and fast moving consumer goods. These decisions were at
the heart of Graeme Snooks’ discussion of the changing boundaries between
household and total economy.102 Up to World War II, households were increasingly
‘buying’ goods and services that were previously produced and consumed within the
family unit. Large scale investment in public infrastructure was a precondition that
had been largely met by the mid-1920s. Increased profits awaited those firms first to
market or who could develop a sustainable competitive advantage. Changes on the
supply side such as the efficiency gains associated with specialisation, new
distribution channels to satisfy customer demands, and a growing reliance on
inimitable proprietary assets provide additional or complementary paths to profitable
investments. Finally, we argue that the outcomes of these shifts in both demand and
supply had large scale linkage effects across the economy.

Ian McLean and Jonathan Pincus have offered the tantalizing comment that ‘there is
the possibility that the nature of economic growth [between 1890 and 1940] was
different from that in the preceding and subsequent periods of much faster
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growth…’103 We believe this paper has helped to reassess and demystify the process
of growth during much of this period.
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Table 1. Sectoral shares of employment, 1900-01 to 1938-39, per cent
Resource-based
Manufacturing
1900-01
33.0
14.6
1910-11
30.5
18.8
1920-21
26.3
19.9
1930-31
28.3
18.4
1938-39
22.7
23.9
Source: Butlin and Dowie, Estimates, Table 6, 153.

Tertiary
52.4
50.7
53.8
53.3
53.4
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Table 2. Sectoral shares of GDP, 1900-01 to 1938-39, per cent
Resource-based
Manufacturing
1900-01
29.7
12.2
1910-11
32.1
13.2
1920-21
30.8
12.5
1930-31
22.6
15.9
1938-39
23.1
18.7
Source: Butlin, Australian Domestic Product, Table 3, 12-13.

Tertiary
58.1
54.7
56.7
61.5
58.2
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Table 3. Consumption of new durables goods, 1919-40 (count of population per unit
of product)
1919-21
Motor
44
Vehicles
Vehicle
43
licences
Radio
licences
Telephones 24

1925

97

1929-30
12

1939-40
8.5

8

6

20

6

12

10

Sources: Population data from Australian Bureau of Statistics,
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3105.0.65.001. All other data from
Vamplew, ed, Australians. Radio licences (for 1925, 1929, 1939) SR 121-122, p. 390;
Telephone subscribers (for 1920, 1930, 1940), TC 160-66, p. 178; Vehicles and
licensed drivers (for 1921, 1929, 1939 and 1919, 1929, 1939 respectively) TC 51-54,
p. 171.
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Table 4. Rank Correlations of Surplus with Output, Capital, Employees and
Establishments

% Change in Output 19/20 - 28/29

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

% Change in capital 19/20 - 28/29

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

% Change in number of employees 19/20 - 28/29

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

% Change in number establishments 19/20 - 28/29

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

% Change in

% Change in

Surplus 19/20 -

Surplus 19/20 -

28/29

28/29
.888

**

.889

**

.000

.000

74

39

.803

**

.803

**

.000

.000

39

39

.808

**

.840

**

.000

.000

74

39

.680

**

.750

**

.000

.000

74

39

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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% Change in

% Change in

Surplus 31/32 to Surplus 31/32 to
38/39
% Change in Output 31/32 to 38/39

% Change in capital 31/32 to 38/39

% Change in number of employees 31/32 to 38/39

Correlation Coefficient

38/39
.916

**

.915

**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

N

152

150

Correlation Coefficient

.631

**

.616

**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

N

152

150

Correlation Coefficient

.850

**

.850

**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

N

150

150

% Change in number establishments 31/32 to 38/39 Correlation Coefficient

.537

**

.537

**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

N

150

150

**. Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: Production Bulletin, various years.
Note: Final column includes only those industries common to all variables.

50

Chart 1. Tariff rates and manufacturing's share of GDP, Employment
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Sources: Overseas trade bulletins; Butlin, Australian Domestic Product Table 3, 12-13; Butlin & Dowie, Estimates table 6.
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